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Abstract
Traditionally, in the United Kingdom and Europe the surgeon was generally not troubled by litigation from patients
presenting as elective as well as emergency cases, but this aspect of custom has changed. Litigation by patients
now significantly affects surgical practice and vicarious liability often affects hospitals. We discuss some
fundamental legal definitions, a must to know for a surgeon, and highlight some interesting cases.
Review
Patients have a fundamental legal and ethical right to
determine what happens to their own bodies. Valid
informed consent is therefore absolutely central in all
forms of surgeries, from providing outpatient procedures
(i.e. biopsy, intra-articular injections, endoscopy...etc.) to
more major operations (i.e. laparotomy, joint replace-
ment, neck dissection...etc.). A patient clearly needs
enough information before deciding to accept or refuse
t h es u r g e r yi . e .t ob ea b l et om a k eac h o i c e[ 1 ] ;t h e
information needs to include what the surgery will
involve, the benefits and the risks of the proposed inter-
vention, what the implications of not having the surgery
are and what alternatives may be available. Also the sur-
geon needs to clarify the practical effect of the surgery
on the quality of life.
Fully Informed Counselled Consent
Informed consent, expressed or implied, as a term is
used to judge how much information should be given to
a patient. The context of consent can take many differ-
ent forms, ranging from the active request by a patient
of a particular treatment to the passive acceptance of a
surgeon’s advice. In many cases, ‘seeking consent’ is bet-
ter described as ‘joint decision-making’: the patient and
the surgeon need to come to a mutual agreement on
the best way forward, based on the patient’sv a l u e sa n d
preferences and the surgeon’s clinical knowledge [2].
In limited circumstances (i.e. non-voluntary therapy), a
surgeon may proceed without a consent. This is given
when the patient is not in the position to have or
express any views as to his or her management (i.e.
unconsciousness, being a minor or the patient’s state of
mind is in such as to render an apparent consent or
refusal invalid). However, involuntary treatment, against
the patient’s wishes, is very rare and has to be ethical
and done when the interests of a third party or the
society is involved [3]. Third party in this context refers
to a party who would sustain harm as a result of failure
of treatment.
Although family members are not allowed to give con-
sent on behalf the ADULT patient [4] it is wise to con-
sult them, with the patient’s permission, if they are
available to ascertain any anticipatory choice on the part
of the patient or other details which might affect clinical
decision [5].
It is important to clarify that certain sorts of surgical
interventions might be regarded as offences under Sec-
tion 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
regardless of whether the patient consented or not.
Female circumcision is specifically proscribed by the
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003; this tends to cause
grievous bodily harm and would not fit within the
“proper” or “reasonable” surgical treatment.
With regard to information, the courts have set broad
parameters to suggest to surgeons that they must seek
that their patients know enough about any proposed
s u r g e r yt ob ea b l et oc h o o s ea n dm a k ear e a s o n a b l e
risk-benefit assessment. A less than 1% complication
risk may be significant in particular circumstances, i.e.
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surgery is not acceptable for a singer.
There is no evidence to suggest that more information
always leads to refusal. Irrational for the surgeon might
be rational for the patient. Studies have showed that
patients want more information but this can be also
counterproductive. If the patient want no further infor-
mation, or couldn’t understand the information given,
more information may lead them to irrationally refusing
much needed surgery. It is not right to force informa-
tion on an unwilling patient. Surgeons must justify that
there may be therapeutic privileges that rationalize the
intervention; however this has to be based on cogent
reasons relating to the welfare of the particular patient.
The Test of Capacity
In any surgical case, the claimant must acquire evidence
from a responsible surgical practitioner not only that
performing a particular procedure would not be negli-
gent but also that it is necessary in the best interests of
the patient [6]; this doesn’t include the surgical side
only, other parameters including spiritual and religious
welfare, general wellbeing and relationship with those
close to the patient are as important. If a capacitated
patient refuse treatment, his refusal must be accepted. If
a person has refused the treatment in advance in a valid
advance directive, this refusal must be honoured.
Respect for patient’s autonomy is considered to be good
medical practice [7] and the priority must be given to
the principle of patient self-determination [8] but all
efforts should be made to promote rational, critical
deliberation [9]. It is logical that a degree of paternalism
may occur when a patient is taking a life and death
decision [10].
Problems with capacity tend to arise if the patient falls
in the category of: under 18 years old, unconscious, cer-
tain mental disorders, under the influence of substances
or in misguided or irrational patients. When a patient is
incapacitated, they can be treated without consent. Most
important is to be able to identify the incapacitated
patient; this is assessed using a status or functional
approach. The status approach depends on the patient’s
status, (i.e. children are presumed to be incapacitated).
While the functional approach focuses on the patient’s
actual capabilities. The functional approach promotes
for the patient’s self-determination [11]. The English
courts prefer the functional approach but have also
adopted a combination of both [12]. English law will
require an individual under 18 years old to prove his or
her requisite capacity while the 18-year-old will be pre-
sumed competent [13].
An Incapacitated patient may still express willingness
or unwillingness to the proposed intervention; this
s h o u l db et a k e ni nc o n s i d e ration when assessing the
patient’sn e e df o rs u r g e r ya n di ft h i si si nt h e i r“best
interests”. The patient might be stressed by a certain
routine procedure, hence one need to think of an alter-
native route to reach a diagnosis that does not compli-
cate treatment and outcome. The only interests should
be taken into account is the “patient’s” and it is not law-
ful or ethical to try to balance this with the interests of
others (i.e. family members, healthcare professionals,
other people living with the patient). However these
should not be totally ignored and should be taken into
account as it provide support and improve outcome.
The Necessity Principle
The basis of this doctrine is that acting unlawfully is jus-
tified if the resulting good effect materially outweighs
the consequences of adhering strictly to the law. It is
used to justify the need to treat incapacitated patients
without consent until they regain the capacity to be able
to give consent for further treatment (i.e. Burr hole sur-
gery for subdural haematoma in a patient with reduced
level of consciousness). Logical reductionism would dic-
tate that no extensive treatment and no non-essential
procedure that is not related to the patient’s immediate
survival should be performed. As being a Good Samari-
tan is a character ‘un-esteemed’ in English Law [14]. So
the court will always assess the procedures undertaken
to see if they are justified or not [15].
Necessity or convenience for treatment can overlap. It
can be quite difficult in clinical situation especially when
the patient is acutely unconscious or undergoing an
emergency or elective procedure under general anaes-
thesia and cannot be consented for an extra procedure
which might represent a necessity to the surgeon at that
time. Consulting other colleagues might be advisable in
such circumstances as well as the patient’s family and
friends [16].
In Marshall v Curry [17] the plaintiff sought damages
for battery when his surgeon removed a testicle during a
hernia operation. The surgeon justified this by stating
that the testicle was diseased and had to be removed to
ensure a successful operation thus to achieve a good
health and preserve life. Here the courts held that it was
necessary to perform this extra procedure. In Murray v
McMurchy [18] while the surgeon was performing a cae-
sarean section, he believed that tying the fallopian tubes
would be in the patient’s best interests, as going through
another pregnancy would be hazardous. The need for
the procedure to be taken could be for good intention
b u tt h e r ew a sn ou r g e n c ya n di tc o u l dh a v eb e e np o s t -
poned to acquire consent; the court held the surgeon
for an act of battery.
In the controversial case of Williamson v East London
and City Health Authority [19]; the patient underwent a
subcutaneous mastectomy when the surgeon found out
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which the patient was consented to have it removed and
replaced in the first place. The patient was awarded
£20,000 in damages because the patient was not con-
sented for this non-emergency procedure. However if
the surgeon would have left the diseased tissue, one
could argue that he has breached his duty of care.
In Re F, a 36-year-old mentally handicapped voluntary
in-patient woman has formed a sexual relationship with
a male patient. The hospital staff discussed that it would
be in her best interest to be sterilized as she would not
be able to cope with the effects of pregnancy and giving
birth. F’s mother, also wished her to be sterilized issued
an originating summons seeking a declaration from the
court. Although this procedure was not a “necessity” it
was deemed “necessary” and in the patient’s “best inter-
ests” [20]. In Re F, the House of Lords suggested that
the criterion for determining whether treatment is in
best interests of an incompetent adult should be
whether it satisfies the familiar Bolam test. They sug-
gested that the standard of care demanded by the tort
of negligence should also govern the decision about
what care should be provided to incapacitated patients.
In a similar case, the court of appeal overturned a
judge declaration to perform a sterilisation or hysterect-
omy on a 29-year-old with severe learning difficulties
suffering menstrual periods. Dame Elizabeth Butler-
Sloss said “where the medical profession seeks a declara-
tion as to lawfulness of the proposed treatment, the
judge, not the doctor, has the duty to decide whether
such treatment is in the best interests of the patient...the
principle of the best interests as applied by the court
extends beyond the considerations set out in the Bolam
case” [21]. Where is there an application of sterilisation
of mentally incompetent patient, the healthcare profes-
sional has to prove that this represent the best option.
In a similar case where a mother of a mentally dis-
abled man sought the court’s approval for carrying out a
vasectomy, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss said “the doctor,
acting to that required standard, has, in my view, a sec-
ond duty, that is to say, he must act in the best interests
of mentally incapacitated patient. I do not consider that
the two duties have been conflated into one requirement”
[22].
Mental Capacity Act 2005
Prior to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which came into
force in 2007, the common law applied to the surgical
treatment of mentally incapacitated patients. According
to the common law, presumption of capacity is based
on the case of Re C test, a case concerning an adult
refusal of treatment [23]. This leading English case on
capacity showed that mental illness and mental incapa-
city are not synonymous with each other [23]. This
three stage test involves the following: (1) Can the
patient comprehend and retain the relevant information?
(2) Is he/she able to believe it? (3) Is he/she able to
weight the information, balancing risks and benefits, in
order to arrive at choice? This test formed the basis of
the statutory test for incapacity in Mental Capacity Act
2005.
One of the most principal changes the Act makes is to
the common law, by introducing the possibility of proxy
medical decision-making for incapacitated adults. A
LPA (lasting power of attorney) is given to a “donee”
who under section 9(1)(a) will have the authority to
make decisions concerning the person’s welfare when/if
he loses capacity. However, the “donee” has no power to
take decisions if it was not in the incapacitated persons
best interests according to section 1 and 4 of the Act. A
court can appoint a deputy to act for the patient accord-
ing to section 16.
Court of Protection has been set up according to Sec-
tion 45 of the Mental Capacity Act with the same
power as the High Court aiming to build up specialist
expertise in matters involving incapacitated individuals.
The Court will be dealing with issues related to the
assessment of lack of capacity, treatment and best inter-
ests of patient and with “advanced decision” and its
validity and applicability.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came as an answer to
many problems facing healthcare professionals. In order
to treat a patient especially if actively objecting to treat-
ment, some element of restraint and detention maybe
necessary; the use of force will not attract liability pro-
vided the conditions in section 6(2) and (3) of the act
are met. This act is different from the Mental Health
Act 2007 which regulates treatment for mental illness
allowing for compulsory treatment and detention. Many
people who are mentally ill do not lack mental capacity.
Overlap between the two Acts exists and few people
who lack mental capacity are eligible for compulsory
treatment under the Mental Health Act 2007.
Capacity in Children
Childhood is defined by law from birth to age of 18 but
can vary when it comes to consent or criminal activities;
a child can consent for surgery from the age of 16 and
courts have held minors’ responsible for criminal activ-
ities. There has been much debate with regard to the
child’s decision-making capacity. Provided that both par-
ents have parental responsibilities, each would normally
be able to grant consent for surgical intervention with-
out consulting the other. If they are married, both have
parental responsibility; if not, the father can acquire par-
ental responsibility by being registered on the child’s
birth certificate. Non-parents with residence orders can
give valid consent to surgery. Non-parents who have
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entitled to do what is reasonable in all circumstances to
safeguard or promote the child’sw e l f a r e[ 2 4 ] .I fad i s -
agreement arises between parents on the most suitable
intervention, the decision will be made by the court
according to its view of where the child’s best interests
lie.
When a surgeon believes that the child needs treat-
ment but the parents refuse to consent, he/she can
apply to court using ‘wardship’ or inherent jurisdiction.
In an emergency, the surgeon would be entitled to treat
in the absence of consent in order to avoid serious
harm or death. When a concerned party believe the
child needs treatment but this is opposed by the sur-
geon and parents, he/she can apply explaining that the
surgeon and parents are not working for the child’s best
interests. An educational psychologist in the case of Re
D applied to have D, who suffers from Soto’s syndrome,
made a ward of court after D’ parents, her paediatrician
and a consultant obstetrician had agreed on sterilizing
her [25]. D had shown no interest in the opposite sex
and had no opportunity to be involved in sexual inter-
course as she was never allowed out alone. The court
declared that the operation should not go ahead.
Best interests of the child can be difficult to justify in
some cases. Blood tests for establishing paternity will
generally be allowed as they are not that invasive and it
will help the child to identify the real parents. When it
come to bone marrow, blood or organ donation, some
people might argue that although this is not in the best
clinical interests of the child but will save a life of a sib-
ling and can be in the child emotional best interests. In
Re Y [26], there was no medical benefit for the patient
who was severely mentally and physically handicapped
and was incapable of giving consent to act as a bone
marrow donor to her sister who was suffering a bone
marrow disorder. The court approved this on the
grounds that this would benefit the sister and mother,
who were in poor health, and would be for the defen-
dant’s (Y) emotional, psychological and social benefit.
In the case of Re B, Jeannette, a 17-year-old girl suf-
fering from mental handicap (mental age of 6). The
House of Lords authorized her sterilization, since if
pregnancy happened she will never be able to cope with
it and she will not be suitable to have contraceptives
[ 2 7 ] .H e r et h i si sc a r r i e do u tt op r e v e n tp r e g n a n c y
rather than treating a medical problem and does repre-
sent the child’s best interest. Another interesting appli-
cation is when the Court of Appeal ordered the
separation of conjoined twins in order to save the stron-
ger twin’s life when the parents refused to consent for
the operation [28].
Courts are, definitely, allowed to use force to detain a
child to ensure that he receives medical treatment.
Cazalet confirmed the permissible use of force to situa-
tions where necessary. The case involved a 17-year-old
crack cocaine addict, who had just given birth and
whose health was seriously at risk. The order stated that
“such reasonable force may be authorized by the local
a u t h o r i t yt ob eu s e dt oi m p l e ment such medical treat-
ment...considered necessary by the doctors concerned”
[29].
The application of ‘Gillick’ competence was the corner
stone of the “competent minor” test. Mrs Gillick, a
mother of ten (five girls, five boys), sought a declaration
that prescribing contraception was illegal because the
doctor would commit an offence of encouraging sex
with a minor, and that it would be treatment without
consent as consent was vested in the parent. The issue
before the House of Lords was only whether the minor
involved could give consent. The House of Lords
focused on the issue of consent rather than a notion of
“parental rights” or “parental powers”. Lord Scarman’s
said “As a matter of Law the parental right to determine
whether or not their minor child below the age of sixteen
will have medical treatment terminates if and when the
child achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence
to understand fully what is proposed” [30].
The lawfulness of research on children who lack capa-
city has never explicitly been considered by the English
courts. However, parents may often be invited to con-
sent to their child being involved in “therapeutic
research”, on the basis that a new treatment may be as
effective, or more effective, than the standard treatment.
The possibility of “non-therapeutic” research may also
arise, where the child will not directly benefit from the
proposed intervention [31].
Capacity in Adults
Patients might be able to make some competent deci-
sions. A pregnant woman gave consent for caesarean
section but not for anaesthetic injection prior to the
procedure as she was needle phobic. The court decided
that the needle phobia has rendered her temporarily
incompetent [32]. Capacity is almost certainly task-spe-
cific; many people are competent to make certain deci-
sions but not others [33].
A surgeon faces many challenges as all surgical disci-
plines continue to advance and a significant part of the
society constitute elderly people. Those people require
continuous medical care and can be seriously ill [34].
With artificial nutrition and ventilation it is becoming
possible to prolong a person’s life despite the failure of
essential bodily functions. It is always a dilemma when
it comes to providing or withholding life prolonging
treatment. A decision to prolong life, not euthanasia
which is unlawful, of a terminally diseased patient might
not be in his/her best interest. The BMA has suggested
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unable to take a decision for himself or herself and it is
believed that continuing to provide ANH (artificial
nutrition and hydration), which is considered a medical
treatment, is not in his or her best interests [35].
In any event, when a patient refuses life-saving surgery
it would be expected that the English Courts will resolve
that doubt in favour of preservation of life [36].
Advanced directives or “living wills” will be binding the
surgical practitioners involved in the patient’s care if it
was proved that the patient was competent when he/she
executed the advanced refusal, fits his/her current predi-
cament and the patient had not subsequently changed
his mind. Advance directives setting out the kind of
care the person would like to receive are not legally
binding, but should be influential when deciding what
treatment is in the person’s best interests. Sections 24
and 25 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 specifically deal
with this issue.
In W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [37], KH suffered
acutely from multiple sclerosis. Although she retained
consciousness, she was disorientated and no longer
recognized her closest family members. She was fed by
a PEG tube through the stomach, could not swallow
and was incontinent, which required her to have 24-
hour-care. There was evidence by family and friends
t h a ts h eh a ds a i di ft h et i m ec a m ea n ds h ec o u l dn o
longer recognize her daughters, she did not want to be
kept alive. The feeding tube was dislodged and the argu-
ment was whether to reinsert or let her die. The Court
found that there was no advanced directive to suggest
that she wanted to die by starvation. In contrast, AK a
19-year-old man suffering from motor neuron disease
requested that the doctors should remove him from
artificial ventilator two weeks after he finally lost the
ability to communicate [38]. The Judge was satisfied
that they genuinely represent AK considered wishes and
should be treated as such.
Another example is Jehovah’s Witnesses who specify
that they would not consent to receive blood transfu-
sion. In Re E, a child needed urgent blood transusion,
for his leukemia, to save his life. Being a devout Jeho-
vah’s Witness, he refused to consent for the treatment
as well as the parents. Ward J said “In my Judgment, A
has by the stand he has taken thus far already been and
become a martyr for his faith. One has to admire...he is,
he says, prepared to die for his faith...But I regret that I
find it essential for his well-being to protect him from
himself and his parents, and so I override his and his
parents’ decision“ [39].
Cases involving anorexic patients are particularly good
examples of the rather blurred line between the protec-
tion of the competent patient’s right to take ‘irrational
decisions’, and the questioning of capacity on the
ground of the patient’s irrational decision-making. The
courts have found anorexics incompetent in a number
of cases and have authorized force-feeding without their
consent [40] this is because the disease creates inability
to understand, believe and weight treatment information
in order to arrive at a choice and thus anorexic patients
will commonly fail the Re C test.
DNAR (do not attempt resuscitate) is a widely
accepted term in hospitals. Cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion can in theory be carried out on any person in
whom cardiac or respiratory function ceases. A compe-
tent patient may choose not to go through this proce-
dure and prefer to die peacefully. The BMA have
published detailed guidance on what procedures should
be followed when decisions about resuscitation need to
be made [41]. NHS Trusts are required to have local
policies on resuscitation, along with information about
them for patients.
Treatment for most conditions remains imperfect, and
research is often carried out to develop new treatments,
or compare the effectiveness of existing treatments. It
may occasionally be in the best interests of a person
who lacks capacity to consent to be entered into a clini-
cal trial of a new treatment, for example if a standard
treatment is non-existent, or of very limited effective-
ness. Bodies such as the Medical Research Council and
the Royal College of Surgeons have suggested that it can
be lawful to carry out research on incapacitated adults
which will not benefit the individual, as long as this is
not against the interests of the individual. Such research
might include, for example, carrying a new form of sur-
gery and carrying invasive investigations for the pur-
poses of research into the condition from which the
person is suffering. The application of ‘Virtue ethics’
suggests that only those patients who choose to partici-
pate in research after having fully informed consent
should be included. Lessons from the past include sev-
eral worldwide examples especially from North America,
the Early 1940’s Germany and South America where
patients were deemed to have incapacity (due mainly to
imprisonment, race or disability) and research was car-
ried out for the “greater good” It is presently deemed
unethical and appears to have a distinct eugenic under-
tone that even today leaves a bitter aftertaste, however
well it is disguised as progress.
Conclusion
The interests of the patient should be the highest prior-
ity of the surgeon treating that patient. The interests of
the patient include medical, psychological social and
others. The surgeon should ensure that the patient
receives adequate information about the intervention.
No patient consent is required when treating incapaci-
tated patient. In these cases the treating surgeons must
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be held responsible for these decisions. Determining
whether an operation is in best interests of an incompe-
tent adult should be whether it satisfies the familiar
Bolam test. The case of Re C, the test formed the foun-
dation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which came as
a legal framework to help deal with the many of dilem-
mas facing healthcare professionals.
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